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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., a debt collector is 
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liable to a consumer for contacting third parties in pursuit of 
that consumer’s debt unless the communication falls under a 
statutory exception.  One of those exceptions covers 
communication with a third party “for the purpose of 
acquiring location information about the consumer” but, even 
then, prohibits more than one such contact “unless the debt 
collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such 
person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now 
has correct or complete location information.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1692b.  In this appeal following a jury verdict and judgment 
entered against a debt collector for repeated contact with third 
parties, we consider a matter of first impression among the 
Courts of Appeals: whether the burden in such a case is on 
the debt collector to prove or the consumer to disprove that 
the challenged third-party communications fit within § 
1692b’s exception for acquisition of location information. 
 We conclude that the debt collector bears that burden and 
will therefore affirm. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
In 2005, Patricia Evankavitch executed a $43,300.00 
mortgage against her property so that she could, in turn, lend 
money to her son, Christopher.1  In order for Evankavitch to 
repay the loan, Christopher regularly deposited checks into 
her bank account, and she then paid the mortgage company.  
Eventually, however, Christopher had financial difficulties 
and stopped depositing his checks.  As a result, Evankavitch 
fell behind on her loan payments.  In May 2011, with 
                                              
 1 For ease of reference, we refer to Evankavitch’s 
children by their first names throughout this opinion. 
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Evankavitch four months behind, the mortgagee’s rights were 
assigned to Green Tree Servicing, LLC (“Green Tree”).2   
Green Tree and Evankavitch had periodic 
conversations about the loan over the next several months.  
Evankavitch initiated one of those discussions by calling 
Green Tree from a cell phone belonging to her daughter, 
Cheryl, which apparently led Green Tree to record Cheryl’s 
number as an additional number where it could reach 
Evankavitch.  Thus, towards the end of 2011, Green Tree 
made numerous unsuccessful calls to Evankavitch at both 
Evankavitch’s and Cheryl’s numbers.   
In January 2012, Green Tree reached Cheryl on her 
cell phone.  Cheryl said that she would ask her mother to call 
Green Tree.  A month later, Evankavitch called Green Tree 
again from Cheryl’s cell phone.  This time, she informed 
Green Tree that the number was her daughter’s and instructed 
Green Tree to stop using it.  Instead, over the next several 
months, representatives from Green Tree continued to call 
both Evankavitch’s and Cheryl’s numbers and left several 
messages on Cheryl’s voicemail requesting that Evankavitch 
call Green Tree.   
                                              
 2 Ordinarily, creditors are not considered debt 
collectors under the FDCPA.  See Pollice v. Nat’l Tax 
Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 (3d Cir. 2000).  However, 
an assignee of a loan “may be deemed a ‘debt collector’ if the 
obligation is already in default when it is assigned.”  Id.  
Green Tree assumed the assignment under those 
circumstances and thus constitutes a debt collector for 
FDCPA purposes in this case. 
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 In August 2012, after failing to reach Evankavitch, 
Green Tree began calling Evankavitch’s neighbors, Robert 
and Sally Heim.  After a Green Tree employee asked Mr. 
Heim to have Evankavitch call Green Tree, Mr. Heim passed 
Green Tree’s contact information on to Evankavitch.3  After 
two more months without hearing from Evankavitch, Green 
Tree made at least three more calls to the Heims, leaving two 
messages and speaking with Mr. Heim once more.  Mr. Heim 
told Green Tree in that final call that Christopher had moved 
to California and that Green Tree should stop calling the 
Heims.  After learning of these communications, Evankavitch 
brought suit, claiming, among other things, that Green Tree 
impermissibly contacted Mr. Heim in its debt collection 
efforts, in violation of § 1692b-c of the FDCPA.   
A. The District Court’s Challenged Rulings 
With limited exceptions, the FDCPA forbids a debt 
collector from contacting third parties in its attempts to 
collect a consumer’s debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), and makes 
the debt collector liable in an individual action for statutory 
damages up to $1,000, over and above any actual damages, 
id. at § 1692k(a).  In both an in limine ruling and in its jury 
charge, the District Court took the position that when a debt 
collector alleges that it made a contact that falls within the 
                                              
 3 Although Green Tree suggests otherwise in its 
briefing, it cites little in the record that indicates that it 
actually attempted to discern the location of Evankavitch 
during this call or any subsequent call.  Instead, these calls to 
the Heims appear to have been made with the same purpose 
as the calls made to Cheryl, i.e., for these third parties to 
function as Green Tree’s message service in soliciting a 
return call from Evankavitch. 
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exception for acquisition of location information, the debt 
collector has the burden to prove the exception as an 
affirmative defense.  Specifically, the District Court advised 
the jury that Evankavitch and Green Tree “agree that the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act is violated in the sense that 
they agree that the Defendant contacted third parties and did 
so multiple times, . . . which is generally a violation of the 
Act.”  App. 404-405.  It went on to state that the “burden is 
on the Defendant to determine and establish that it sought 
location information.”  App. 405.  Thus, the District Court 
instructed:   
[T]he issues for you to decide are[:] one, 
whether the Defendant has established that it 
contacted the third parties to obtain location 
information; and two, whether the Defendant 
contacted the third party multiple times because 
the Defendant reasonably believed that the 
earlier response of the third party is incorrect or 
incomplete, and that the third party now has the 
correct or the complete location information.   
App. 408. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Evankavitch.  
The District Court entered judgment in her favor for $1,000, 
and this appeal ensued.  Green Tree argues on appeal that 
both the in limine ruling and the jury instructions were 
improper, such that the verdict should be vacated and this 
matter re-tried with the burden of proof on Evankavitch to 
disprove that any exception applied.   
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.   
When reviewing a jury charge, “we exercise plenary 
review to determine whether the instruction misstated the 
applicable law.”  Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times 
Co., 424 F.3d 336, 338 (3d Cir. 2005).4  We also exercise 
plenary review over legal rulings made pursuant to an in 
limine order.  United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 814 (3d 
Cir. 1988).    
                                              
4 Evankavitch argues that Green Tree failed to preserve 
its objection to the charge so that we should reverse only if 
the error is “fundamental and highly prejudicial or if the 
instructions are such that the jury is without adequate 
guidance on a fundamental question and our failure to 
consider the error would result in a miscarriage of justice.”  
Fashauer v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 57 F.3d 1269, 1289 
(3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
disagree.  After a careful review of the record, we conclude 
that Green Tree’s trial counsel adequately raised its 
objections and that the District Court made a definitive and 
“explicit rejection of [Green Tree’s] proposed instructions.” 
Collins v. Alco Parking Corp., 448 F.3d 652, 656 (3d Cir. 
2006).  
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III. Discussion 
A. The FDCPA and Its General Prohibitions on 
Third-Party Contacts 
The FDCPA was enacted in 1977 in response to “the 
abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair 
debt collection practices by many debt collectors.”  Lesher v. 
Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 996 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The purpose of 
the Act is both to “eliminate abusive debt collection 
practices” and to “‘insure that those debt collectors who 
refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not 
competitively disadvantaged.’”  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 
1692(e)).  As remedial legislation, the Act is construed 
broadly to effectuate those purposes.  Caprio v. Healthcare 
Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 
2013).  
“[T]he invasion of privacy,” we recently explained, is 
“a core concern animating the FDCPA.”  Douglass v. 
Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014); 
accord 15 U.S.C. 1692(a) (stating that unfair debt collection 
practices lead to, among other things, “invasions of individual 
privacy”).  One way Congress addressed this concern was to 
“prohibit[] a debt collector from communicating with third 
parties about the consumer’s debt.”  Edwards v. Niagara 
Credit Solutions, Inc., 584 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(citing § 1692c(b)).  Legislative history indicates this 
prohibition was considered an “extremely important 
protection.”  S. Rep. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.   
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In recognition of a “debt collector’s legitimate need to 
seek the whereabouts of missing debtors,” id. at 4, however, 
the Act provides an exception to this general prohibition for 
communications made “for the purpose of acquiring location 
information about the consumer.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692b.5  In 
other words, a debt collector may contact third parties to 
ascertain where it may locate the consumer.  That exception is 
itself limited, however, as debt collectors may “not 
communicate with any such person more than once . . . unless 
the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response 
of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such 
person now has correct or complete location information.”  
Id. at § 1692b(3).   
None of our sister Circuits has yet addressed the 
question whether the consumer has the burden of disproving 
this exception as part of its case-in-chief, or whether the debt 
collector carries the burden of proving the exception as an 
affirmative defense, and the district courts have taken 
divergent approaches.6  It is to this question we now turn. 
                                              
5 Other exceptions to the general prohibition on third-
party communications include prior consent by a consumer, 
the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, 
and communications reasonably necessary for a debt collector 
to effectuate a post-judgment judicial remedy.  15 U.S.C. § 
1692c(b). 
 
6 Compare, e.g., Williams v. Web Equity Holdings, 
LLC, No. 13-13723, 2014 WL 3845952, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 5, 2014) (“The language of § 1692b(3) creates an 
exception for debt collectors seeking to locate the debtor to 
contact persons they reasonably believe have such location 
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B. Determining Burdens of Proof 
We generally start our analysis with the plain text of a 
statute.  But where, as here, that text “is silent on the 
allocation of the burden of persuasion,” we “begin with the 
ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to 
prove their claims.”  Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 
U.S. 49, 56 (2005).  This long-standing, common-sense rule 
stems from the understanding that “[t]he burdens of pleading 
and proof with regard to most facts have been and should be 
assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the 
present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be 
expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.”  2 
McCormick On Evid. § 337 (7th ed. 2013).   
                                                                                                     
information. This, in turn, imposes a pleading burden on 
plaintiffs alleging a violation of this section to provide facts 
to support an inference that the debt collector had no reason 
to believe that the person knew the whereabouts of the debtor 
or that they provided an incomplete or erroneous response.”), 
with Kempa v. Cadlerock Joint Ventures, L.P., No. 10-11696, 
2011 WL 761500, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2011) 
(“CadleRock has not provided any evidence to show that, in 
any of her messages or communications to Kempa’s parents, 
Hunt stated that she was confirming or correcting Kempa’s 
location information. . . .  Since the FDCPA is a strict liability 
act, Kempa is entitled to summary judgment with regards to 
Kempa’s 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) claim.”), and Kasalo v. 
Monco Law Offices, S.C., No. 09-2567, 2009 WL 4639720, at 
*6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2009) (“[W]e treat the exception in 
Section 1692b(3) on which defendant relies as an affirmative 
defense, which defendant has the burden of proving.”).    
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Green Tree essentially asks that we end our inquiry at 
this point and treat the default rule as an absolute one.  We 
decline, for “when both a statute and its legislative history are 
silent on the question” of the burden of proof, “[i]t is common 
ground that no single principle or rule solves all cases by 
setting forth a general test.”  Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62 (2005) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 
Conservation v. E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 494 n.17).7    
Beyond the ordinary default rule that a plaintiff bears 
the burden of proving her claims, we glean from decisions of 
the Supreme Court, this Court, and other Courts of Appeals a 
                                              
 7 The FDCPA’s legislative history, while not 
completely silent on the subject, offers little insight into 
Congress’s intent.  At the beginning of the legislative process, 
the House of Representatives placed the burden of proof on 
the debt collector after a minimal showing by the consumer.  
The House proposed a burden-shifting framework under 
which, if a consumer alleged that a debt collector 
inappropriately contacted a third party and pleaded that he or 
she did not consent to any third-party contacts, the burden of 
proof would shift to the debt collector.  H. Rep. 95-131, 19 
(1977).  Among other changes, and without a readily apparent 
explanation, the Senate did not include that subsection in its 
version of the Act, S. Rep. 95-382 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, which the House adopted in its entirety 
by floor amendment, avoiding a conference committee, 123 
Cong. Rec. 28109 (Sept. 8, 1977).  Given this ambiguity, and 
lacking “that veritable Rosetta Stone of legislative 
archaeology, a crystal clear Committee Report,” United States 
v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part), we do not accord weight to this legislative history. 
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number of factors relevant to our analysis here, including: (1) 
whether the defense is framed as an exception to a statute’s 
general prohibition or an element of a prima facie case; (2) 
whether the statute’s general structure and scheme indicate 
where the burden should fall; (3) whether a plaintiff will be 
unfairly surprised by the assertion of a defense; (4) whether a 
party is in particular control of information necessary to prove 
or disprove the defense; and (5) other policy or fairness 
considerations.  We address each factor below. 
1. Statutory Exceptions 
The Supreme Court has instructed that while the 
default rule applies to “most” disputes about burdens, 
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57, another “general rule of statutory 
construction” provides “that the burden of proving 
justification or exemption under a special exception to the 
prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its 
benefits,” FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948); 
see also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 
91 (2008) (repeating “the familiar principle that ‘[w]hen a 
proviso . . . carves an exception out of the body of a statute or 
contract those who set up such exception must prove it’”) 
(quoting Javierre v. Cent. Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 
(1910)); United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 190 & n.5 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (compiling “numerous Supreme Court decisions” 
for the proposition that “where the statute contains . . . an 
exception, the defendant bears the burden of proving it”).  
This “longstanding convention is part of the backdrop against 
which the Congress writes laws, and we respect it unless we 
have compelling reasons to think that Congress meant to put 
the burden of persuasion on the other side.”  Meacham, 554 
U.S. at 91-92.   
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Here, § 1692c(b) states that “[e]xcept as provided in 
section 1692b . . . a debt collector may not communicate, in 
connection with the collection of any debt, . . . [with third 
parties].”  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  Thus, the FDCPA generally 
prohibits a debt collector from contacting third parties, with 
the debt collector’s ability to seek location information 
framed as an exception to this general prohibition.  Repeat 
contacts made pursuant to that exception are even further 
limited, with telltale language likewise indicative of an 
affirmative defense:  
Any debt collector communicating with any 
person other than the consumer for the purpose 
of acquiring location information about the 
consumer shall . . . not communicate with any 
such person more than once unless requested to 
do so by such person or unless the debt 
collector reasonably believes that the earlier 
response of such person is erroneous or 
incomplete and that such person now has 
correct or complete location information[.] 
15 U.S.C. § 1692b(3) (emphasis added); see United States v. 
Franchi-Forlando, 838 F.2d 585, 591 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, 
J.) (stating that introducing provisions with the words 
“unless” and “except” may indicate an affirmative defense).  
Moreover, in assessing which party has the burden of 
proof under this rule, courts often “focus[] on the relationship 
between the defense in question and the plaintiff’s primary 
case,” and “on whether a defense raises factual or legal issues 
other than those put in play by the plaintiff’s cause of action.”  
In re Sterten, 546 F.3d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 2008).  Put 
differently, as we recently held in the criminal context, 
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“[w]hether a particular statutory phrase constitutes a defense 
or an element of the offense . . . turns on whether the statutory 
definition is such that the crime may not be properly 
described without reference to the exception.”  Taylor, 686 
F.3d at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted).  If that is the 
case, “the exception is an element of the crime”; if not, the 
exception is an affirmative defense.  Id. 
 In the case of the FDCPA, no reference to the Act’s 
exceptions is necessary to discern that calls to third parties in 
pursuit of collecting a consumer’s debt are prohibited.  
Instead, what constitutes a violation is apparent from the plain 
language of § 1692c(b).  Thus, we find no compelling reason 
to reverse the “longstanding convention” that a party seeking 
shelter in an exception—here, the debt collector—has the 
burden to prove it.  Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91.   
2. The Statutory Scheme 
The structure of the statute, another useful indicator of 
Congressional intent, also leads us to place the burden of 
proof on the debt collector.  See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(1988) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is 
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme.”); 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.  v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 
484 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1987) (analyzing statutory language in a 
way that is in accord with the “language and structure” of the 
section of law at issue).   
We find persuasive in this regard that the language and 
interaction of the general prohibition in § 1692c(b) and its 
exception for location information in § 1692b closely track 
the language and interaction of § 1692k, which imposes civil 
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liability for FDCPA violations, and its two exceptions, which 
are widely recognized as affirmative defenses.  See Jerman v. 
Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 
573, 578 (2010) (citing 15 U.S.C §§ 1692k(c) and (e) for the 
proposition that “[t]he Act contains two exceptions to 
provisions imposing liability on debt collectors”).  The first of 
these is the so-called good faith error defense, which 
explicitly places the burden on the debt collector to prove that 
it acted unintentionally and had procedures in place to avoid 
such an error.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).8  The second provides a 
safe harbor for a debt collector that seeks and receives legal 
opinions from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
before they proceed.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e).9  Although this 
second exception lacks the explicit burden-shifting language 
of the first, both are delineated as affirmative defenses by § 
1692k(a)’s general statement that a debt collector shall be 
held liable “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this section,” 
with the particular affirmative defenses described in separate 
subsections.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a), (c), (e). 
                                              
8 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) states: “A debt collector may 
not be held liable . . . if [it] shows by a preponderance of 
evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted 
from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of 
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 
   
9 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) states: “No provision of this 
section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or 
omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion 
of the [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] . . . .”  
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The location-information exception at issue in this case 
qualifies § 1692c(b)’s general prohibition against third-party 
contacts in almost identical terms, providing that third-party 
contacts are forbidden “[e]xcept as provided in section 
1692b,” and setting off the description of the exception in that 
separate section.  Such placement of the exception and the 
general prohibition in different parts of the statute has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court as indicative of an 
affirmative defense.  See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 87, 91 
(concluding that an exception for employer conduct otherwise 
prohibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
constituted an affirmative defense based in part on “how the 
statute reads, with exemptions laid out apart from the 
prohibitions”).  Thus, the statutory structure and the parallels 
between the language of § 1692c(b), with its exception for 
location-information in § 1692b, and § 1692k(a), with its 
well-established affirmative defenses in §§ 1692k(c) and 
1692k(e), strongly indicate that § 1692b also was intended to 
be an affirmative defense.   See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1362 (2013) (“[W]e normally 
presume that . . . words . . . carry the same meaning when 
they appear in different but related sections.”); Gwaltney, 484 
U.S. at 59-60 (interpreting statute in accord with its general 
language and structure). 
Green Tree attempts to differentiate § 1692k on the 
ground that its exceptions require a showing of subjective 
intent or good faith and thus are appropriately deemed 
affirmative defenses because the proof is in the possession of 
the debt collector.  In contrast, Green Tree argues, one of § 
1692b’s subsections, the provision that allows for follow-up 
calls to obtain location information if the debt collector 
“reasonably believes” the third party did not originally 
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provide and now has complete or accurate information, 
imports an objective test into § 1692b, such that the exception 
can and should be disproven by the plaintiff.10  Green Tree’s 
argument proves too much, however, for the sine qua non of 
any communication that qualifies under § 1692b, whether 
initial or follow up, is that the communication was “for the 
purpose of” acquiring location information—a question of 
subjective intent that is appropriate, even by Green Tree’s 
logic, for treatment as an affirmative defense.  
3. Avoiding Surprise and Undue 
Prejudice 
Another factor for our consideration in categorizing an 
exception as an affirmative defense is the need to avoid unfair 
surprise and undue prejudice.  See Sterten, 546 F.3d at 285; 
see also Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th 
Cir. 1987).  In examining this concern, we consider, given 
what a plaintiff is “already required to show” to prove its 
case, whether a defendant’s failure to raise the specific issue 
                                              
 10 In support, Green Tree cites to the Fourth Circuit’s 
unpublished, per curiam opinion in Worsham v. Accounts 
Receivable Management., Inc., 497 F. App’x 274, 277 (4th 
Cir. 2012).  Worsham, however, did not address the burden of 
proof under § 1692b but only the standard for reasonableness 
under § 1692b(3), concluding “[t]he use of the word 
‘reasonably’ indicates that this is an objective standard that 
the debt collector must meet to avoid liability under the 
FDCPA.”  Id.  Moreover, albeit in dictum, the court’s 
reference to the objective standard as one “the debt collector 
must meet,” would appear, if anything, to undermine Green 
Tree’s position.   
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would otherwise “deprive[] [a plaintiff] of an opportunity to 
rebut that defense or to alter her litigation strategy 
accordingly.”  Sterten, 546 F.3d at 285.  
In Sterten, a consumer brought a case pursuant to the 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., 
alleging that a creditor failed to accurately disclose finance 
charges in connection with a home mortgage.  546 F.3d at 
281.  We found no unfair surprise when a defendant, 
referencing a general denial in its answer to the complaint, 
later sought shelter in TILA’s “tolerances provision,” a 
section of the statute that specifies the extent to which a 
lender may miscalculate a finance charge before incurring 
liability.11  See id. at 285-87 (examining 15 U.S.C. § 1605(f)).  
In concluding there was no undue prejudice to the plaintiff-
consumer as a consequence of the defendant’s failure to raise 
the tolerances provision as an affirmative defense, we 
reasoned that the very same analysis that a consumer would 
undertake to prove that a disclosure was inaccurate would 
also reveal whether the inaccuracy fell within the tolerances 
provision.  Id. at 285.  In other words, proving the claim 
would necessarily disprove the defense, and the consumer 
therefore would neither have sought different discovery nor 
altered her trial strategy had the defendant affirmatively 
pleaded the defense, rather than a general denial.  Id. 
                                              
11 In Sterten, we addressed the burden of pleading 
rather than the burden of proof at trial, a distinction without a 
difference for purposes of today’s analysis.  See Taylor v. 
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008) (stating that when a party 
seeks shelter in an affirmative defense it is “[o]rdinarily . . . 
incumbent on the defendant to plead and prove such a 
defense”). 
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The exception we consider here stands in stark 
contrast.  If a debt collector acknowledges that it made a 
generally prohibited call, but contends it did so based on a 
purpose or reasonable belief that would exempt it from 
liability, a diligent consumer will need to explore the debt 
collector’s knowledge and intent.  Thus, a consumer faced 
with the assertion that a call was made pursuant to the 
FDCPA’s location-information exception would reasonably 
change her discovery and trial strategy to prove that the debt 
collector was not seeking location information, or, in a 
follow-up call, did not have a reasonable belief that the earlier 
information was incorrect and likely to be corrected.  
Accordingly, considerations of unfair surprise and undue 
prejudice also counsel in favor of finding that § 1692b is an 
affirmative defense. 
4. The Party with Peculiar Knowledge 
of the Relevant Facts  
Another general rule of statutory construction, “that 
where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the 
knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of proving the 
issue,” also indicates the burden rests with the debt collector.  
Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 9 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n Inc. 
v. AT&T Corp., 238 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that 
“all else being equal, the burden is better placed on the party 
with easier access to relevant information”).  This “ordinary 
rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the 
burden upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within 
the knowledge of his adversary.”  Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60 
(quoting United States v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 355 U.S. 
253, 256 n.5 (1957)); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 
635, 640-41 (1980) (holding that qualified immunity is an 
 20 
 
affirmative defense to a § 1983 action in part because the 
facts that might support the defense are in the possession of 
the official asserting it).   
Here, Green Tree has unique access to the information 
at issue: its purpose for making the calls to third parties and 
its basis, if any, when making follow-up calls, to reasonably 
believe the third parties did not originally provide and later 
had correct or complete information.  Where the consumer 
challenges a communication from a debt collector to the 
consumer herself under the FDCPA, the consumer can be 
expected to attach and offer into evidence a copy of a written 
communication, see, e.g., McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & 
Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2014) (examining 
letter from a law firm to a consumer), or to plead and testify 
about a verbal communication, see, e.g., Hoover v. Monarch 
Recovery Mgmt., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 589, 596 (E.D. Pa. 
2012) (examining allegedly harassing telephone calls).  
Where the communication is from a debt collector to a third 
party, however, the consumer will have no first-hand 
knowledge of the conversation, and the third party cannot 
reasonably be expected to keep notes about or recall in detail 
random calls to his or her home.  See Lupyan v. Corinthian 
Colls. Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 322 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizing 
that only the most “enterprising (or particularly compulsive) 
individual” would “maintain logs of incoming” 
correspondence).   
This reality was laid bare when, at trial and in its 
briefing before us, Green Tree was unable to adduce any 
credible evidence—despite deposition testimony from 
multiple call-center employees, a corporate designee’s pretrial 
deposition, and two days of trial testimony with a recess for 
the express purpose of allowing that same corporate designee 
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to search Green Tree’s records yet again—that Mr. Heim 
originally gave incorrect or incomplete information or that the 
calls made to the Heims were for the purpose of acquiring 
new or updated location information about Evankavitch.12  
Moreover, when questioned at argument as to how 
Evankavitch would prove her claim if we were to remand and 
place the burden on her, Green Tree candidly acknowledged 
that her case would be difficult because Mr. Heim could not 
recall significant details about the conversations.  Thus, if 
Green Tree’s reading of the statute were correct, the absence 
of information—seemingly caused by its own lax record-
keeping—would inure to its benefit, and the only party with 
any realistic ability to document the conversation would be 
motivated to do the opposite.  Common sense dictates against 
this result. 
The Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) 
interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(“TCPA”), an analogous consumer protection statute, rests 
upon the same premise.  The TCPA makes it unlawful “to 
make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes 
or made with the prior express consent of the called party) 
using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial 
or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to 
                                              
 12 Nor was Green Tree able to adduce such evidence 
with regard to the calls to Evankavitch’s daughter.  Rather, 
because Evankavitch had placed two calls to Green Tree from 
Cheryl’s cellphone (albeit, in one of them, to advise Green 
Tree that the number was her daughter’s and should not be 
called), Green Tree urged the jury to conclude that the 
repeated calls to Cheryl did not constitute third-party calls at 
all.  
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a . . . cellular telephone service.”  47 U.S.C. § 
227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).  Put differently, the statute forbids, among 
other things, autodialing a person’s cell phone, with two 
exceptions: consent and emergency.  
Like the FDCPA, the TCPA is silent about the burden 
of proving these exceptions.  However, pursuant to a 
declaratory ruling by the FCC, “the creditor should be 
responsible for demonstrating that the consumer provided 
prior express consent,” 23 F.C.C.R. 559, 565 (Jan. 4, 2008), 
and the courts generally have placed the burden to prove 
these TCPA exceptions on the creditor, see Osorio v. State 
Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014); 
Hartley-Culp v. Credit Mgmt. Co., No. 14-0282, 2014 WL 
4630852, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2014); Elkins v. Medco 
Health Solutions, Inc., No. 12-2141, 2014 WL 1663406, at *6 
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2014).  The rationale for treating these 
TCPA exceptions as affirmative defenses applies as well to 
the FDCPA:  To the extent a caller seeks to avail itself of an 
exemption to a general ban on a certain category of calls, the 
caller is in the best position to generate and maintain records 
of those communications.  
5.  Other Fairness and Policy 
Considerations 
The soundness of placing the burden on the debt 
collector is even more compelling when considered in the 
context of Congress’s concern, expressly stated in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692(a), with the “invasions of individual privacy” of 
consumers.  See Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 238 F.3d at 131 
(“[T]he policies underlying the statute at issue are 
appropriately considered by courts when allocating the 
burden of proof.”); Ingraham, 808 F.2d at 1079 (holding that 
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policy considerations are an appropriate factor in determining 
burdens of proof).   
While Mr. Heim may not have understood the precise 
details of his conversations with Green Tree, he clearly 
understood the subject matter to be private and sensitive—the 
very type of interaction the FDCPA is intended to limit.  See, 
e.g., Tr. of Robert Heim, ECF No. 25-3, 9:14-17 (“If they 
were [calling] from Green Tree or whatever, [they would] ask 
if I would get Patty next door, I -- I wouldn’t go.  I wouldn’t 
bother her with something like that.  It’s her own business.”); 
id. at 13:6-9 (“I [kept] telling them, don’t call this house again 
for a message to go next door.  I said, I have my own 
problems and she has hers.”).   Saddling consumers with the 
burden to prove the absence of the debt collector’s proper 
purpose or reasonable belief, however, would mean that 
consumers like Evankavitch would endure the embarrassment 
of such calls to neighbors and other third parties with no 
means of proving a FDCPA violation unless those third 
parties took copious notes or recalled the conversations in 
detail or the debt collector offered up testimony or 
documentary proof of its own violation in discovery.  It 
would also run contrary to the tenet that “all else . . . being 
equal, courts should avoid requiring a party to shoulder the 
more difficult task of proving a negative.”  Nat’l Commc’ns 
Ass’n, 238 F.3d at 131; see also Lupyan, 761 F.3d at 322 
(“The law has long recognized that such an evidentiary feat is 
next to impossible.”).    
In sum, allocating the burden to the consumer would 
be inconsistent with the Act’s remedial purpose and our duty 
to construe it broadly, see Lesher, 650 F.3d at 997, and we 
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therefore will place the burden where it belongs: on the debt 
collector.13 
IV. Conclusion 
We started our analysis with the default rule that a 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving her claim, but we end 
                                              
13 Green Tree makes additional arguments, including 
(1) because Congress crafted two explicit affirmative 
defenses in the Act, we should not read other, implicit 
defenses into it; and (2) our holding would create a burden-
shifting scheme too complex for a jury to apply.  Neither is 
persuasive.  First, “the canon that expressing one item of a 
commonly associated group or series excludes another left 
unmentioned is only a guide, whose fallibility can be shown 
by contrary indications that adopting a particular rule or 
statute was probably not meant to signal any exclusion of its 
common relatives.”  United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 
(2002).  That is, we will not assume that Congress’s explicit 
apportionment of burden on a defendant in certain 
circumstances implies rejection of the apportionment of 
burden in other circumstances, unless we discern an 
indication that Congress considered and meant to exclude the 
latter.  See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 
1175 (2013).  We discern no such intent in the provisions of 
the FDCPA at issue.  Second, juries are more than capable of 
evaluating basic justifications and affirmative defenses.  See, 
e.g., Dixon, 548 U.S. at 17 (affirming conviction where a jury 
charge stated the defendant had to prove affirmative defense 
of duress ); United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 343 (3d Cir. 
2000) (affirming conviction where a jury charge “placed the 
burden of persuasion on the affirmative defense of 
justification on the defendant”). 
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with the canon that, absent compelling reasons to the 
contrary, a party seeking shelter in an exception to a statute 
has the burden of proving it.  We find no such compelling 
reasons in this case.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
District Court’s jury instructions and in limine ruling properly 
placed the burden of proof on Green Tree, and we will affirm. 
